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We consider a two-player zero-sum game, given by a Markov chain over a finite set of states and a family of matrix
games indexed by states. The sequence of states follows the Markov chain. At the beginning of each stage, only
player 1 is informed of the current state, then the corresponding matrix game is played and the actions chosen
are observed by both players before proceeding to the next stage. We call such a game a Markov chain game with
lack of information on one side. This model generalizes the model of Aumann and Maschler of zero-sum repeated
games with lack of information on one side (which corresponds to the case where the transition matrix of the
Markov chain is the identity matrix). We generalize the proof of Aumann and Maschler and, from the definition
and the study of appropriate “non revealing” auxiliary games with infinitely many stages, show the existence
of the uniform value. An important difference with Aumann and Maschler’s model is that here, the notions for
player 1 of using the information and revealing a relevant information are distinct.
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1. Introduction. Repeated games with incomplete information were introduced in the sixties by
Aumann and Maschler [3] (for a reedition of their work). Their simplest model is the one of two-player
zero-sum repeated game with lack of information on one side and perfect observation: at the beginning
of the play, a state of nature k is chosen according to an initial probability p over a finite set of states K,
and announced to player 1 only. This state of nature determines a finite zero-sum game Gk which is then
repeatedly played over and over, and after each stage the actions played are observed by both players. In
this setup, Aumann and Maschler showed the existence of the value, and gave a famous characterization
for it. They also proved the existence of optimal strategies for the players. This pioneering work has
been widely extended since the sixties, and a lot of important works are dedicated to this model, or close
extensions of it. For example, let us mention Aumann et al. [3] or Mertens and Zamir [10] for the case
of incomplete information on both sides, Kohlberg [7] for an explicit construction of an optimal strategy
for player 2, or Sorin [17] Hart [5] and Simon et al. [15] for the non-zero sum case.
We only consider here two player zero-sum games and generalize the above model to the case where the
state of nature is no longer fixed once and for all at the beginning of the game, but evolves according to a
given Markov chain, and at the beginning of each stage is observed by player 1 only. We call such games
Markov chain games with lack of information on one side, since here also only player 2’s information is
incomplete. Note that this model is a special case of stochastic game with incomplete information, which
may fail to have a value (Sorin [18], see also Rosenberg and Vieille [14]). Recently, Rosenberg et al.
[13] proved the existence of the value in a particular class of games generalizing Aumann and Maschler’s
model. These games are defined via a collection of stochastic games : initially nature chooses a stochastic
game, and player 1 only is informed of the selected game. Only one player controls the transition, and
these games are neither more nor less general than the ones studied here.
In this paper, we generalize the proof of Aumann and Maschler and show the existence of the value
in Markov chain games with lack of information on one side. However, several problems remain. Our
expression of the value cannot be easily computed from the basic data of the game, and we present a
very simple example where we cannot compute it. About optimal strategies, we obtain the existence of
an optimal strategy for player 2, but we still do not know if there exists such a strategy for player 1.
A. Neyman and an anonymous associate editor suggested the possibility that there exists an alternative
proof of the existence of the value based on the application of the result of Aumann and Maschler to our
framework.
Section 2 of this paper contains the model. A few important examples, and the main ideas of the proof,
are presented in section 3. In section 4 we formally introduce a projection matrix which will be used to
quantify a notion of “relevant information” for player 2. In section 5 we study the values of the N -stage
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games and show that player 2 can guarantee their limit v∗. In section 6 we define and study a notion of
“non revealing” strategies for player 1. In section 7 we define auxiliary games called non revealing games,
where player 1 is restricted to play a non revealing strategy. The values of the non revealing games are
used in section 8 to show that player 1 can guarantee some quantity w∗ in the original game. In section
9 we show that v∗ = w∗, and this implies the existence of the value. We conclude with several remarks
on the model and possible extensions. A few proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2. The model. If S is a finite set, |S| denotes its cardinality and ∆(S) the set of probability
distributions over S. ∆(S) is viewed as a subset of IRS . For q = (qs)s∈S in IRS , we use ‖q‖ =
∑
s∈S |qs|.
We denote by K = {1, ..., |K|} the set of states, by I the set of actions of player 1 and by J the set
of actions of player 2. K, I and J are assumed to be finite and non empty. We have a family (Gk)k∈K
of |I | × |J | payoff matrices for player 1, and a Markov chain on K, given by an initial probability p on
K and a transition matrix M = (Mkk′ )(k,k′)∈K×K . All elements of M are non negative and for each k in
K,
∑
k′∈KMkk′ = 1.
An element q = (qk)k∈K in ∆(K) will also be represented by a row vector q = (q1, ..., q|K|), with
qk ≥ 0 for each k and ∑k∈K qk = 1. If the law of the state at some stage is q, the law of the state at the
next stage is the product qM . For each k in K, δk denotes the Dirac measure on k.
The play of the zero-sum game is as follows:
-at stage 1, k1 is chosen according to p, and told to player 1 only. Players 1 and 2
independently choose an action in their own set of actions, i1 ∈ I and j1 ∈ J respectively.
The stage payoff for player 1 is Gk1(i1, j1), (i1, j1) is publicly announced, and the play
proceeds to stage 2.
- at stage n ≥ 2, kn is chosen according to δkn−1M , and told to player 1 only. The
players independently choose an action in their own set of actions. If in ∈ I and jn ∈ J
are selected, the stage payoff for player 1 is Gkn(in, jn). (in, jn) is publicly announced,
and the play proceeds to the next stage.
Note that the payoffs are not announced after each stage. Players are assumed to have perfect recall,
and the whole description of the game is public knowledge. It will be convenient to keep the initial
probability on K as a parameter, so we denote by Γ∞(p) the game just defined.
A behavior strategy for player 1 is an element σ = (σn)n≥1 where for each n σn is a mapping from
the cartesian product (K × I × J)n−1×K to ∆(I) giving the mixed action played by player 1 at stage n
depending on past and current states and past actions played. Since player 2 does not observe the states,
a behavior strategy for him is an element τ = (τn)n≥1, where for each n τn is a mapping from (I ×J)n−1
to ∆(J). Denote by Σ and T , respectively, the set of behavior strategies of player 1 and player 2. A
strategy profile (σ, τ) induces a probability distribution over the set of plays Ω = (K × I × J)∞, and
we denote, for each positive N , the average expected payoff for player 1 induced by (σ, τ) at the first N
stages by:
γpN (σ, τ) = IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
Gkn(in, jn)
)
where kn, in, jn respectively denote the state, action for player 1 and action for player 2 at stage n.
We will also consider explicitly strategies in games with finitely many stages. For N ≥ 1, ΣN will
denote the set of N -stage behavior strategies of player 1. An element σ in ΣN is just an element
(σn)n∈{1,...,N}, where for each n, σn is a mapping from (K × I × J)n−1 ×K to ∆(I). Similarly, TN will
denote the set of N -stages strategies for player 2. The definition of the payoff γpN (σ, τ) trivially extends
to the case where σ and τ are strategies with finitely many stages. The N -stage game ΓN (p) is defined as
the zero-sum game with strategy spaces ΣN and TN , and payoff function γpN . By Kuhn’s theorem about
the equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies, ΓN (p) can be viewed as a mixed extension of a
finite game, and hence it has a value denoted by vN (p), and both players have optimal strategies. Note
that vN (p) is also the value of the zero-sum game with strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function γpN .
Concerning the infinite game Γ∞(p), we will use the following standard notion of uniform value.
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Definition 2.1 Let v be a real number.
- Player 1 can guarantee v in Γ∞(p) if:
∀ε > 0 ∃σ ∈ Σ ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀τ ∈ T , γpN (σ, τ) ≥ v − ε.
- Player 2 can guarantee v in Γ∞(p) if:
∀ε > 0 ∃τ ∈ T ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀σ ∈ Σ, γpN (σ, τ) ≤ v + ε.
- v is the value of Γ∞(p) if both players can guarantee v in Γ∞(p).
Notice that if player 1 (resp. player 2) can guarantee v, then liminfNvN (p) ≥ v (resp. limsupNvN (p) ≤
v). It is then easy to see that if the value v of Γ∞(p) exists, it is necessarily unique and equal to limNvN (p)
(one can show that it is also the limit of the value of the discounted games as the discount factor goes to
zero, see e.g. Sorin [19], lemma 3.1 p.27).
Definition 2.2 Assume that the value v of Γ∞(p) exists.
A strategy σ of player 1 is said to be optimal if:
∀ε > 0 ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀τ ∈ T , γpN (σ, τ) ≥ v − ε.
Similarly, a strategy τ of player 2 is optimal if:
∀ε > 0 ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀σ ∈ Σ, γpN (σ, τ) ≤ v + ε.
In this paper we prove the following result.
Theorem 2.3 Γ∞(p) has a value, and player 2 has an optimal strategy.
We will use the following notations and definitions.
If x = (x(i))i∈I ∈ ∆(I) and y = (y(j))j∈J ∈ ∆(J), for each state k we denote by
Gk(x, y)=
∑
i∈I,j∈J x(i)y(j)G
k(i, j) the expected payoff for player 1 in state k if i in I and j in J are
selected according to the probabilities x and y, respectively. For each p in ∆(K), u(p) will denote the
value of the matrix game
∑
k∈K p
kGk , i.e. :
u(p) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
k∈K
pkGk(x, y).
It will turn out that player 1 never needs to take into account the actions played by player 2, so for sim-
plicity we will often consider the following type of strategies. A strategy σ = (σn)n of player 1 (in Σ or in
ΣN ) will be called independent of the actions of player 2 if for each n and (k1, i1, j1, ..., kn−1, in−1, jn−1, kn)
in (K× I×J)n−1×K, σn(k1, i1, j1, ..., kn−1, in−1, jn−1, kn) does not depend on (j1, ..., jn−1). We denote
by Σ+ (or Σ+N for N -stages strategies) the set of such strategies of player 1.
Finally, we denote by C an upper bound for all absolute values of payoffs, i.e. C satisfies: |Gk(i, j)| ≤ C
for all k, i, j. And if f : ∆(K) −→ IR is bounded from above, cavf denotes the pointwise smallest
concave function g on ∆(K) satisfying g(p) ≥ f(p) for each p in ∆(K).
3. Examples and overview of the proof. We first notice the following important fact. Assume
that player 1 does not use his information on the states, i.e. plays some strategy which is independent of
the sequence of states. Then the belief of player 2 on the current state of stage n+1 (i.e. the conditional
probability on the state of stage n+ 1 given the initial probability p, the strategy used by player 1 and
the actions played up to stage n) is the unconditional probability over the state of stage n + 1, so it is
just pMn. We start with examples.
Example A: A Markov chain without memory
Consider the following transition matrix (there are two states): M =
(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)
.
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At each stage n ≥ 2, the new state is chosen according to the probability p∗ = (1/2, 1/2) on ∆(K),
independently of the previous state. Player 1 can use at each stage his knowledge of the current state,
and player 2 will never learn anything relevant about future states. For any initial probability p, each
stage n ≥ 2 of the repeated game Γ∞(p) is similar to the 1-stage game Γ1(p∗), hence Γ∞(p) has a value
which is v1(p
∗).
A more complex irreducible aperiodic Markov chain is now presented.
Example B: An irreducible aperiodic Markov chain
The transition matrix is now: M =
(
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
)
.
This Markov chain has a unique recurrence class which is aperiodic, and has p∗ = (1/2, 1/2) as unique
invariant measure. (Mn)n converges to
(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)
, hence for any p in ∆(K), (pMn)n converges to
p∗. This implies that if player 1 plays independently of the states, the belief of player 2 on the current
state converges to p∗.
For any N player 1 can play in Γ∞(p) as follows: (1) play for N stages an optimal strategy in ΓN(p∗),
then (2) play independently of the states for a fixed number of stages (this number becoming much smaller
than N when N is large), and come back to (1). This shows that player 1 can guarantee limsupNvN (p
∗).
Concerning player 2, recall that pMn −→n→∞ p∗. For any N , he can play as follows in Γ∞(p): play for
N stages an optimal strategy in ΓN(p
∗), then forget everything and redo from start. This shows that
player 2 can guarantee infNvN (p
∗) in Γ∞(p). And we can conclude that Γ∞(p) has a value which is
infNvN (p
∗), hence independent of p.
Notice that this proof can be generalized to the case of any irreducible aperiodic Markov chain.
Example C: M is the identity matrix.
This is the standard case of repeated game with lack of information on one side. In this case, the
initial state is selected at the beginning of the game and remains constant. It is well known (see Aumann
Maschler [3]) that the value v(p) of Γ∞(p) exists and satisfies:
v(p) = cavu(p).
The proof of Aumann and Maschler can be sketched as follows.
1) For each N player 2 can play as follows in Γ∞(p): play for N stages an optimal strategy in
ΓN (p), then forget everything and redo from start. We obtain that player 2 can guarantee infNvN (p), so
limNvN (p) exists and can be guaranteed by player 2.
2) Aumann and Maschler defined, for each initial probability p = (pk)k∈K , a “non revealing” game
corresponding to the game where player 1 does not use his information on the selected state, i.e. where
he plays independently of the state. This game can be analyzed as the repetition of the average matrix
game
∑
k∈K p
kGk. Consequently, its value is just the value u(p) of the average game and player 1 can
guarantee this quantity by playing independently of the states. By a property, which is now standard
(see for example [19, prop. 2.2. p.16]), of games with lack of information on one side, one can then
deduce that player 1 can guarantee cavu(p) in the original game.
3) The last point is to show that limNvN (p) ≤ cavu(p). This is done by considering, for a fixed strategy
of player 1, the a posteriori of player 2 on the selected state of nature (i.e. after each stage, the belief on
the state depending on the previous actions played). The sequence of a posteriori forms a martingale,
and a classical bound on its L1 variation gives the above inequality.
We insist on the fact that here, the non revealing games correspond to the game where player 1 does
not use his information on the states. The relevant information for player 2 is in this case the initial state,
or equivalently the recurrence class of the Markov chain. We will generalize this proof to the general case.
Remark 3.1 Aumann and Maschler [3] also generalize their result to the case where each player observes
after each stage a signal which is function of the actions played. In this setup, they already notice the
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difference betwween using and revealing information and they define a non revealing strategy of player 1
as a strategy that keeps unchanged the belief of player 2 on the state.
Example D: A periodic chain
Let K be {a, b}, and M be
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
The Markov chain has a unique recurrence class, which is periodic with period 2. Here the relevant
information for player 2 is not the recurrence class, but if the sequence of states will be (a, b, a, b, a, b, ...),
or (b, a, b, a, b, a, ...). By considering the play of stages by blocks of length 2, we can reduce the problem
here to that of example C. The point is that M 2 is the identity matrix.
This idea of playing stages by blocks of fixed length could be used in the general case to assume
w.l.o.g. that the chain is aperiodic. We will however not assume aperiodicity in the following proofs,
because it would simplify almost nothing.
A last aspect of finite Markov chains is the possible existence of transient states. This does not play
an important role here, because player 1 can always wait during the first stages until the current state
is a recurrence one. We however present now an example with a transient state. This example, and our
last example below, will be used later to illustrate several definitions.
Example E: K = {a, b, c}, and M =

 1 0 00 1 0
1/2 1/4 1/4

.
Example F: K = {a, b, c}, and M =

 2/3 1/3 01/3 2/3 0
0 0 1

.
To prove the existence of the value in case of example F is more difficult, and we do not know how
to proceed without following the general proof presented in this paper. Notice that we have here two
kinds of information: a long-term information (corresponding to the recurrence class {a, b} or {c}, as
in the Aumann-Maschler case), and a short-term information (corresponding to the state a or b if we
are in the class {a, b}). We now come back to the general case and describe the different steps of our proof.
Overview of the proof:
One can show, as in example B, that player 2 can guarantee the limit of (vN (p))N . This will be done
in section 5 and not discussed now.
The main conceptual difficulty is to generalize point 2) of the proof of Aumann and Maschler. We will
define an appropriate version of the non revealing games. In the case of example A, at each stage player 1
can use his knowledge of the current state without revealing anything important. The use of information
is “free” for player 1, since information will be generated anew. On the contrary, in the Aumann and
Maschler’s case, as soon as player 1 uses some piece of information, the martingale of a posteriori moves
and a relevant piece of information is revealed to player 2. In the general case, we will define and quantify
the information of player 1 which is relevant to player 2 in the long run. The basic and main idea is that
this information for player 2 can be described by the asymptotic behavior of the sequence of states.
Recall that if player 1 does not use his information on the states, the belief of player 2 on the
current state of stage n + 1 is pMn. An important property of a finite Markov chain is that
the limit behavior of the sequence (pMn)n can always be approximated by a periodic sequence
(pB0, pB0M, ..., pB0M
L−1, pB0, pB0M, ...), L being a common multiple of the periods of the recurrence
classes of the Markov chain, and B0 being the limit, as n goes to infinity, of (M
nL)n. B0 is unique,
it is a stochastic matrix, and also a projection matrix (B20 = B0). This matrix takes into account the
recurrence classes of M , but also the periodic aspect of these classes, and its existence is fundamental
for our proof. In particular, if player 1 never uses his information the relevant information for player 2
can be summarized by limnpM
nL = pB0, since this characterizes the asymptotic periodic sequence. And
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if player 1 does not use his information after some stage n, the relevant information for player 2 about
the limit behavior of the sequence of states is qn = pnB−n, where pn is player 2’s belief, computed after
stage n, on the state of stage n+ 1, and B−n = limtM tL−n.
Fix now any strategy of player 1. (qn)n will turn out to be a martingale representing player 2’s current
relevant information over the limit behavior of the sequence of states (see definition 6.1 in section 6 for
a formal definition of qn). qn will simply be called player 2’s relevant information after stage n, and we
define a non revealing strategy for player 1 at p as a strategy such that this martingale is almost surely
constant (and, for convenience, which plays independently of the actions of player 2). So a non revealing
strategy of player 1 does not necessarily play independently of the states, as in Aumann and Maschler’s
case. This is especially the case when the Markov chain has a unique recurrence class which is aperiodic:
if player 1 chooses his actions depending on the current state for a certain number of stages, and then
play independently of the states, all the information obtained by player 2 will vanish since his belief
on the current state will still converge to the unique invariant probability measure. So a non revealing
strategy of player 1 may give some information about the states, in the short term, to player 2. But it
will give no relevant information in the long term to player 2. For player 1, the two notions of not using
the information and not revealing a relevant information are different here.
We define the non revealing game at p, denoted by Γˆ∞(p), as the auxiliary game where player 1
is restricted to play a non revealing strategy at p. This auxiliary game has infinitely many stages, and
cannot be analyzed as a repeated matrix game as in Aumann and Maschler’s case. Indeed, in the case of a
recurrent aperiodic Markov chain, all strategies of player 1 are non revealing and the original game Γ∞(p)
and the non revealing game Γˆ∞(p) coincide. Section 6 is devoted to the definition and a careful study
of non revealing strategies. Section 7 deals with non revealing games, and first consists of a technical
generalization of section 5 to auxiliary games where the set of strategies of player 1 is restricted in some
way (which can be: no restriction at all). We notably prove a version, adapted to non revealing games, of
Aumann and Maschler’s “splitting lemma”, and a recursive formula for the values vˆN (p) of the N -stages
non revealing games. At the end of section 7, we prove, using the definition of non revealing strategies,
that player 1 can guarantee some quantity in the non revealing game, and then obtain that Γˆ∞(p) has
a value w(p) which satisfies: w(p) = infN≥1vˆNL(pB0). Since player 1 can guarantee w(p) in the non
revealing game, a fortiori he can guarantee w(p) in the original game Γ∞(p), and we will show in section
8 that player 1 can guarantee cavw(pB0) in Γ∞(p).
It will remain in section 9 to generalize point 3) of the proof of Aumann and Maschler. Indeed, our
definitions of relevant information and non revealing games can only be justified if we link the values
of the original N -stage games to the ones of the non revealing games. Let’s consider a LNT -stage
(original) game, with N fixed and T large, and fix any strategy of player 1. For each block t = 1, ..., T
of LN stages, we consider an approximation of player 1’s strategy on this block as a non revealing
one, and then we consider a best reply of player 2 against this approximation in a corresponding
non revealing game with LN stages. One can then show from the bound on the L1- variation of
the martingale (qn)n that limnvn(p) ≤ cavvˆNL(pB0). The rest is mainly technical. We show that
cavw(pB0) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0), so cavw(pB0) ≥ limNvN (p). Since in the original game with initial
probability p, player 2 can guarantee limNvN (p) and player 1 can guarantee cavw(pB0), we are done
and the value of Γ∞(p) is cavw(pB0) = limNvN (p).
4. Limit beliefs over the current state of an unobserved Markov chain. An important
property of finite Markov chains is that the sequence of unconditional beliefs (p, pM, pM 2, ..., pMn, ...)
can be approximated by a periodic sequence (pB0, pB1, ..., pBL−1, pB0, pB1, ...) that we define now.
Proposition 4.1 There exists a positive integer L and stochastic matrices B0, B1,..., BL−1 such that:
∀l ∈ {0, ..., L− 1}, limn→∞MnL+l = Bl.
The proof is omitted and can be easily deduced, e.g., from Gordon [4], or Norris [11, Theorem 1.8.5,
p.44]. The only thing to show is the existence of some L such that (MnL)n converges. From a linear
algebra viewpoint, this is due to the fact that if z is a complex eigenvalue of M with |z| ≥ 1, then there
exists a positive integer n such that zn = 1. L corresponds to a common multiple of all such n, or
equivalently, to a common multiple of the periods of the recurrence classes of M .
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As (MnL)2 −→n→∞ B20 , B0 is a projection matrix, that is B20 = B0. Notice that B0 is necessarily
unique. The set of invariant probability measures of B0 will play an important role, hence we introduce
the following notations.
Notations:
Q = {q ∈ ∆(K), qB0 = q} = {pB0, p ∈ ∆(K)}
For each q in Q, A(q) = {p ∈ ∆(K), pB0 = q}.
If q = qB0, then qM
L = qB0M
L = qB0 = q, hence it is easy to see that Q also is the set of invariant
probability measures of the matrix ML. Notice also that Q and each set A(q) are polytopes.
It is convenient to define Bn for each integer n. We put, for each (possibly negative) integer n, Bn = Bl,
where l ∈ {0, ..., L−1} and n− l is a multiple of L. We then have for each integer n, M tL+n −→t→∞ Bn,
and:
∀p ∈ IN, MpBn = BnMp = Bn+p.
5. N-stage games. For each positive integer N and each p in ∆(K), ΓN (p) is the N -stage game
with initial probability p, and has a value vN (p). The payoff function γ
p
N satisfies:
∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀τ ∈ T , γpN (σ, τ) =
∑
k∈K
pkγδkN (σ, τ).
Consequently, vN is, as a function of p, Lipschitz with constant C. Moreover it is concave, since ΓN (p)
is a game with incomplete information on one side with player 1 as the informed player (see for example
Zamir [20]). In order to prove a recursive formula for vN , we first need some notations.
Let p be in ∆(K) representing player 2’s belief on the current state at some stage n ≥ 1, this belief being
computed before stage n is played. Assume that player 1’s action at this stage will be chosen according
to some x = (xk)k∈K ∈ ∆(I)K , i.e. that player 1 plays, for each k, according to xk = (xk(i))i∈I if the
current state is k. The probability that player 1 plays at stage n some action i in I will be denoted by:
x(p)(i) =
∑
k∈K
pkxk(i).
For each i in I , the conditional probability on the state of stage n given that player 1 has played i at this
stage is denoted by pˆ(x, i) ∈ ∆(K). We have:
pˆ(x, i) =
(
pkxk(i)
x(p)(i)
)
k∈K
(if x(p)(i) = 0, pˆ(x, i) is defined arbitrarily in ∆(K).) Obviously,
∑
i∈I x(p)(i)pˆ(x, i) = p. And the
expected stage payoff for player 1 is, if player 2 plays according to y in ∆(J):
G(p, x, y) =
∑
k∈K
pkGk(xk , y).
We can now state the recursive formula, where v0 is defined arbitrarily. The proof is very standard and
can be found in the Appendix. It will be generalized in section 7 to non revealing games (for a general
recursive formula in repeated games, see thm 3.2 p.187 in Mertens et al.).
Proposition 5.1 For each n ≥ 1 and p in ∆(K),
vn(p) =
1
n
max
x∈∆(I)K
min
y∈∆(J)
(
G(p, x, y) + (n− 1)
∑
i∈I
x(p)(i) vn−1(pˆ(x, i)M)
)
=
1
n
min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)K
(
G(p, x, y) + (n− 1)
∑
i∈I
x(p)(i) vn−1(pˆ(x, i)M)
)
In Γn(p), player 1 has a strategy σ = (σn)n≥1 such that at each stage n′, σn′ only depends on player 1’s
past actions i1, ..., in′−1 and on the current state kn′ .
8 :Mathematics of Operations Research xx(x), pp. xxx–xxx, c©200x INFORMS
Remark 5.2 vn(p) is also the value of the n-stage stochastic game where the set of states is ∆(K), player
1’s set of actions is ∆(I)K , player 2’s set of actions is ∆(J), the stage payoff is given by ((p, x, y) 7−→
G(p, x, y)), and the transition between states is controlled by player 1 only: if the state is p, and player 1
plays x, the new state is pˆ(x, i)M with probability x(p)(i). In this stochastic game, player 1 has an optimal
strategy which is a Markovian strategy: the action played at each stage only depends on the current state
and on the stage number.
Corollary 5.3 ∀p ∈ ∆(K), vn(p)− vn−1(pM) −→n→∞ 0.
Proof: Since vn−1 is concave, we have for each p: vn(p) ≤ 1n (v1(p) + (n − 1)vn−1(pM)). On the
other hand, player 1 may play independently of the state. By taking x ∈ ∆(I)K such that xk = xk′
for all k and k′, we get: vn(p) ≥ 1n (u(p) + (n − 1)vn−1(pM)). Since payoffs are uniformly bounded,
vn(p)− vn−1(pM) −→n→∞ 0. 2
We now define a function v∗ on ∆(K) which will turn out to be the value of Γ∞(p).
Definition 5.4 ∀p ∈ ∆(K), v∗(p) = infN≥1vNL(pB0).
v∗ is concave as an infimum of concave functions. For each p, v∗(p) = v∗(pB0), hence for each q in Q the
restriction of v∗ to A(q) is constant. The next proposition is inspired by example B.
Proposition 5.5 For each p in ∆(K), player 2 can guarantee v∗(p) in Γ∞(p).
Proof: Fix p in ∆(K), N ≥ 1, and let τNL be an optimal strategy for player 2 in ΓNL(pB0).
We divide the set of stages {1, 2, ..., n, ...} into consecutive blocks B1, B2, ..., Bm,... of length NL.
Define the strategy τ of player 2 in Γ∞(p) as follows: at each block Bm, play according to τNL (and
forget everything that has happened at previous blocks). For each m, Bm begins at stage (m−1)NL+1,
and the (unconditional) probability on the state at this stage is pM (m−1)NL.
Since |γpB0NL (σ′, τ ′) − γpM
(m−1)NL
NL (σ
′, τ ′)| ≤ ‖pB0 − pM (m−1)NL‖C for each strategy pair (σ′, τ ′), we
have that for any strategy σ in Σ,
IEp,σ,τ
(
1
NL
∑
n∈Bm G
kn(in, jn)
) ≤ vNL(pB0) + C‖pB0 − pM (m−1)NL‖.
As (MnL)n converges to B0, we obtain that: ∀ε > 0 ∃N0 ∀N1 ≥ N0, ∀σ ∈ Σ γpN1(σ, τ) ≤ vNL(pB0) + ε.
Hence player 2 can guarantee vNL(pB0) in Γ∞(p). 2
Corollary 5.6 (vn)n≥1 uniformly converges to v∗ on ∆(K). v∗ is Lipschitz with constant C and satisfies
v∗(p) = v∗(pM) for each p in ∆(K).
Proof: From the definition of guaranteeing, proposition 5.5 implies that for all p in ∆(K):
limsupnvn(p) ≤ infn≥1vnL(pB0) ≤ liminfnvnL(pB0).
Since B20 = B0, we obtain for all p in ∆(K):
limsupnvn(pB0) ≤ infn≥1vnL(pB0) ≤ liminfnvnL(pB0).
So (vnL(pB0))n converges to infn≥1vnL(pB0) = v∗(p). Since it is clear from the definition of γpn that
vn(p)− vn+1(p) −→n→∞ 0, (vn(pB0))n converges to v∗(p).
Put v(p) = liminfnvn(p) and v¯(p) = limsupnvn(p). By corollary 5.3, v(p) = v(pM) and v¯(p) = v¯(pM).
Moreover v and v¯ are Lipschitz with constant C, hence continuous. Since (MnL)n converges to B0, we
have v(p) = v(pB0) = v
∗(p) = v¯(pB0) = v¯(p). And (vn(p))n converges to v∗(p).
Since (vn)n is a sequence of continuous concave functions (pointwise) converging to v
∗ which is con-
tinuous and concave, and since ∆(K) is a polytope, (vn)n uniformly converges to v
∗ (see for example
Mertens et al , part A, p.46, ex. 15 ). 2
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Remark 5.7 p being fixed, proposition 5.5 can be stated as: ∀ε > 0 ∃τ ∈ T ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀σ ∈ Σ,
γpN (σ, τ) ≤ v∗(p) + ε. It can be strengthened in order to get the existence of a single strategy τ of player
2 such that : ∀ε > 0 ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀σ ∈ Σ, γpN (σ, τ) ≤ v∗(p) + ε. To construct such τ , modify
slightly the strategy presented in proposition 5.5 as follows. Divide the set of stages into consecutive
blocks B1, ..., Bm,..., where for each m, Bm has cardinality mL. At each block Bm, play according to an
optimal strategy for player 2 in ΓmL(pB0). As vmL(pB0) −→m→∞ v∗(p), τ has the required property.
Since we will finally show that v∗(p) is the value of Γ∞(p), this will imply that τ is an optimal strategy
of player 2 in Γ∞(p).
Remark 5.8 It is known (see e.g. [19]) that in Aumann and Maschler’s case, (vN (p))N≥1 is non-
increasing. This property is no longer satisfied here, and in point 4 of the last section we give an example
where (vNL(p))N≥1 is not non-increasing.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof that player 1 can guarantee v∗(p) in Γ∞(p).
6. Non revealing strategies. The basic idea is that in Γ∞(p), the relevant information is only the
asymptotic behavior of the sequences of states, hence the projection pB0. This is due to the fact that
both players can “wait” for a large number of stages and place themselves approximately in Γ∞(pB0).
Fix some strategy σ of player 1 and some stage n, and consider the point of view of player 2 after
stage n has been played (player 1 using σ). Player 2 can compute his belief pn on the next state, i.e. on
the state of stage n + 1. He can estimate the asymptotic behavior of this sequence of states as follows:
for any t ≥ n + 1, his belief on the state of stage t is qn,t = pnM t−(n+1). This sequence of beliefs can
be asymptotically approximated by a periodic sequence of period L. This sequence is characterized, for
example, by limt→∞qn,tL+1, which is pnB−n. Hence the relevant information for player 2 after stage n
has been played can be summarized by pnB−n.
Consequently we will define non revealing strategies for player 1 as strategies such that the sequence
(pnB−n)n is (almost surely) constant. For convenience, and because player 1 does not need to use
the actions played by his opponent, we will also require that a non revealing strategy for player 1
plays independently of the actions played by player 2. For any n in IN , we denote by Hˆn the set of
possible actions of player 1 up to stage n. Hˆn = {(i1, ..., in) ∈ In} = In (Hˆ0 standing for a singleton {h0}).
Fix p in ∆(K), and assume that player 1 plays in Γ∞(p) some strategy σ in Σ+. (p, σ) induces a
stochastic process (k1, i1, k2, i2, ..., kn, in, ...) over (K × I)∞. For n in IN and hn = (i1, ..., in) ∈ Hˆn, we
denote by pn(p, σ)(hn) ∈ ∆(K) the belief of player 2 on the state kn+1 of stage n+1 knowing that player
1 plays σ and hn has occurred (i.e. player 1 played i1 at stage 1,..., in at stage n) . Since σ ∈ Σ+,
this belief is independent of the actions played by player 2. pn(p, σ)(hn) is just a conditional probability,
indeed we simply have for each state k:
pkn(p, σ)(hn) = IPp,σ(kn+1 = k|hn).
pn(p, σ)(hn) is defined arbitrarily in ∆(K) if IPp,σ(hn) = 0 (we will proceed similarly for all further
conditional probabilities).
Definition 6.1 Fix the initial probability p in ∆(K), and the strategy σ of player 1 in Σ+. For n in IN
and hn in Hˆn, the relevant information of player 2 after hn has been played is defined as:
qn(p, σ)(hn) = pn(p, σ)(hn)B−n ∈ ∆(K).
pn(p, σ) and qn(p, σ) are random variables defined on the measurable space (Ω, Hˆn), where Hˆn is the
σ-algebra generated by the projection of any play to the first n actions of player 1. p0(p, σ) is just p and
q0(p, σ) is pB0.
Lemma 6.2 For any σ in Σ+, (qn(p, σ))n≥0 is a (Hˆn)n≥0 martingale with respect to IPp,σ.
Proof: Fix n in IN and hn = (i1, ..., in) ∈ Hˆn. Let in+1 be in I and put hn+1 = (i1, ..., in+1). We denote
the conditional probability on the state kn+1 on stage n + 1 knowing that player 1 has played hn+1 by
rn(p, σ)(hn+1). We have IEp,σ(rn(p, σ)|hn) = pn(p, σ)(hn) and pn+1(p, σ)(hn+1) = rn(p, σ)(hn+1)M .
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Consequently,
IEp,σ(qn+1(p, σ)|hn) = IEp,σ(pn+1(p, σ)B−1−n|hn)
= IEp,σ(rn(p, σ)MB−1−n|hn)
= pn(p, σ)(hn)B−n
= qn(p, σ)(hn).
2
Definition 6.3 A strategy σ in Σ+ is called non revealing at p if for each n in IN , qn+1(p, σ) = qn(p, σ)
IPp,σ a.s.
We can already notice the following point. Let σ be non revealing at p, n be a multiple of L and hn be in
Hˆn such that IPp,σ(hn) > 0. Then pn(p, σ)(hn)B−n = pB0, hence pn(p, σ)(hn)B0 = pn(p, σ)(hn)B−nMn
= pB0M
n = pB0. Thus pn(p, σ)(hn) ∈ A(pB0). Whenever player 1 uses a non revealing strategy at p,
the belief of player 2 on the current state essentially remains in the set A(pB0). This will be used to
study the values of the non revealing games.
We denote by Σˆ(p) the set of strategies of player 1 that are non revealing at p. If σ = (σn)n≥1 in
Σ+ is independent of the states (i.e. if ∀n ≥ 1, σn only depends on the (n − 1) first actions of player
1), then pn(p, σ) = pM
n for each n, hence qn(p, σ) = pB0 = q0(p, σ). Thus σ is non revealing at p, and
Σˆ(p) contains all such strategies of player 1. We now give a characterization, which can be seen as an
alternative definition, of non revealing strategies.
Fix σ in Σ+, let n in IN and hn = (i1, ..., in) in Hˆn be such that IPp,σ(hn) > 0. We denote by
x(p, σ)(hn) ∈ ∆(I)K the expectation of player 1’s action at stage n+ 1 depending on the current state:
∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K, xk(p, σ)(hn)(i) = IPp,σ(in+1 = i|kn+1 = k, hn)
Recall that if p ∈ ∆(K) is player 2’s belief on the state at some stage n, computed after stage n − 1,
and player 1 plays at this stage according to some x in ∆(I)K , then for each i in I pˆ(x, i) denotes the
updated probability on the state of stage n given that player 1 has played i at this stage. Hence player 2’s
information on the asymptotic behavior of the sequence of states can be described by pB0 before stage n
is played, and by pˆ(x, i)B0 after i has been played at stage n.
Definition 6.4 For each probability p on K, we put:
NR(p) = {x ∈ ∆(I)K , ∀i ∈ I s.t. x(p)(i) > 0, pˆ(x, i)B0 = pB0}.
Recall that for each i in I , x(p)(i) =
∑
k∈K p
kxk(i). It is plain that NR(p) can also be written as:
NR(p) = {x ∈ ∆(I)K , ∀i ∈ I, (pkxk(i))k∈KB0 = x(p)(i) pB0}.
NR(p) contains all x = (xk)k∈K with xk = xk
′
for all k and k′, hence is non empty. It is clearly a convex
compact subset of ∆(I)K . We can now characterize non revealing strategies at p.
Proposition 6.5 Let σ be in Σ+, and p be in ∆(K).
σ is non revealing at p ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ IN, ∀hn ∈ Hˆn s.t. IPp,σ(hn) > 0, x(p, σ)(hn) ∈ NR(pn(p, σ)(hn)).
Proof: Fix p and σ. For simplicity of notations, we omit to mention (p, σ) when writing x(p, σ)(hn),
pn(p, σ)(hn) and qn(p, σ)(hn).
Let n be in IN , hn = (i1, ..., in) be in Hˆn s.t. IPp,σ(hn) > 0. Put for simplicity x = x(p, σ)(hn) ∈ ∆(I)K ,
and pn = pn(p, σ)(hn) ∈ ∆(K). For any i in I , IPp,σ(in+1 = i|hn) =
∑
k∈K IPp,σ(kn+1 = k|hn)xk(i) =∑
k∈K p
k
nx
k(i) = x(pn)(i).
Fix in+1 in I , and let hn+1 be (i1, ..., in, in+1). If IPp,σ(hn+1) > 0, we have: (IPp,σ(kn+1 =
k|hn+1))k∈K = pˆn(x, in+1). So pn+1(hn+1) = pˆn(x, in+1)M , and qn+1(hn+1) = pˆn(x, in+1)B−n.
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We now prove the =⇒ part of the proposition. Assume that σ is non revealing at p. Then for each n
in IN , hn in Hˆn and in+1 in I s.t. IPp,σ(hn) > 0 and x(hn)(in+1) > 0, we have qn+1(hn, in+1) = qn(hn).
Writing pn for pn(hn), we have pˆn(x(hn), in+1)B−n = pnB−n, so pˆn(x(hn), in+1)B0 = pnB0. Hence
x(hn) ∈ NR(pn).
We conclude with the ⇐= part. Assume that ∀n ∈ IN, ∀hn ∈ Hˆn s.t. IPp,σ(hn) > 0, x(hn) ∈
NR(pn(hn)).
Fix n in IN , and hn+1 = (i1, ..., in+1) s.t. IPp,σ(hn+1) > 0. Put hn = (i1, ..., in). Then
qn+1(hn+1) = pˆn(x(hn), in+1)B−n = pˆn(x(hn), in+1)B0M l, where n + l is a multiple of L. By hypoth-
esis, pˆn(x(hn), in+1)B0 = pn(hn)B0, thus qn+1(hn+1) = pn(hn)B0M
l = pn(hn)Bl = qn(hn). (qn)n≥0 is
constant IPp,σ-a.s.. 2
In order to illustrate the previous notions, we come back to the examples of section 3.
In examples A and B, (Mn)n converges to
(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)
, which is B0. For each p in ∆(K), pB0 =
(1/2, 1/2) does not depend on p, hence every strategy of player 1 in Σ+ is non revealing at p. Player 1
can use his information on the current state without revealing to player 2 any information on the limit
behavior of the sequence of states. Here Q reduces to the singleton {(1/2, 1/2)}, and B0 is the projection
matrix on Q.
In examples C and D, B0 is the identity matrix hence for each p, NR(p) = {x ∈
∆(I)K , ∀(k, k′) s.t. pk > 0 and pk′ > 0, xk = xk′}. A non revealing strategy for player 1 is, like in
Aumann and Maschler case, a strategy in Σ+ that plays at each stage independently of the current state
(formally, that plays the same mixed action in all states having a positive probability). Example C shows
how our definition generalizes the one of Aumann and Maschler.
These first four examples indeed only show extreme cases where the set of non revealing strategies at
p is mainly independent of p. In case of example F, one obtains that B0 =

 1/2 1/2 01/2 1/2 0
0 0 1

, and for
each p with full support,
NR(p) =
{
x ∈ ∆(I)K , ∀i ∈ I, x(p)(i) = xc(i) = p
axa(i) + pbxb(i)
pa + pb
}
.
Notice thatNR(p) does not depend on the “weights” of p over recurrence classes, i.e. does not only depend
on pa+pb, but depends on the conditional probability pa/(pa+pb). Here, Q = {(pk)k∈K ∈ ∆(K), pa = pb}
and B0 corresponds to the orthogonal projection on Q.
In Example E we have two recurrence classes, and c is a transient state. B0 =

 1 0 00 1 0
2/3 1/3 0

,
and Q = {(pk)k∈K ∈ ∆(K), pc = 0}. For p in ∆(K) with full support,
NR(p) =
{
x ∈ ∆(I)K , ∀i ∈ I, p
axa(i) + 2/3pcxc(i)
pa + 2/3pc
=
pbxb(i) + 1/3pcxc(i)
pb + 1/3pc
}
.
We now prove some elementary results on the structure of the set of non revealing strategies of player 1.
First notice that since player 1 has perfect recall in the original game Γ∞(p), by Aumann’s extension [2]
of Kuhn’s theorem any strategy of player 1 in Σ can be viewed as a mixed strategy, i.e. as a probability
distribution over the set of pure strategies of player 1 in Γ∞(p), and vice-versa.
Lemma 6.6 Fix q in Q, and S a positive integer.
Consider p =
∑S
s=1 λsps, with p1,...,pS elements of A(q), λ1,..., λS non negative numbers such that∑S
s=1 λs = 1, and for each s let σs be a non revealing strategy for player 1 at ps. Then we have:
(1) If σ in Σ+ satisfies IPp,σ =
∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs , then σ is non revealing at p.
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(2) There exists some strategy σ non revealing at p and such that IPp,σ =
∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs .
Proof:
(1) Let n be in IN and hn be in Hˆn such that IPp,σ(hn) > 0. For each k in K,
pkn(p, σ)(hn) =
IPp,σ(hn, kn+1 = k)
IPp,σ(hn)
=
∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs(hn, kn+1 = k)∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs(hn)
=
∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs(hn)p
k
n(ps, σs)(hn)∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs(hn)
Hence pn(p, σ)(hn) is in the convex hull of {pn(ps, σs)(hn), s = 1, ..., S}. Since for each s in S,
qn(ps, σs)(hn) = psB0 = q, we have qn(p, σ)(hn) = q = pB0 and σ is non revealing at p.
(2) We define σ via the splitting procedure of Aumann and Maschler. To play according to σ, observe
the first state k, then choose s in S with probability λsp
k
s/p
k. Finally play in the whole game according
to σs.
σ is actually defined as a mixture of behavior strategies, and by Aumann’s extension of Kuhn’s theorem,
σ can be viewed as an element of Σ. Moreover σ does not depend on the moves of player 2, hence can be
considered as an element of Σ+. Let now A be any measurable subset of (K × I)∞.
IPp,σ(A) =
∑
k∈K
IPp,σ(k1 = k)IPp,σ(A|k1 = k)
=
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
s∈S
IPp,σ(s|k1 = k)IPp,σ(A|k1 = k, s)
=
∑
s∈S
λs
∑
k∈K
pksIPδk ,σs(A)
=
∑
s∈S
λsIPps,σs(A)
So IPp,σ =
∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs , and (1) shows that σ is non revealing at p. 2
Remark 6.7 In Aumann and Maschler’s case, A(q) is a singleton and the previous lemma is not very
helpful. However, we consider lemma 6.6 as the analog, adapted to non revealing strategies, of Aumann
and Maschler’s splitting lemma (see e.g. Zamir [20]). This lemma may be reformulated as follows: if p
is a convex combination
∑
s∈S λsps, and if for each s in S we are given a (revealing or non revealing)
strategy σs of player 1 in Σ
+, then there exists a strategy σ in Σ+ such that IPp,σ =
∑S
s=1 λsIPps,σs .
The proof is exactly the same as the proof of point (2) of lemma 6.6, which is thus due to Aumann and
Maschler. They used the splitting lemma to study what can be guaranteed by player 1 in the original game
Γ∞(p). We will proceed similarly with lemma 6.6, but to study what can be guaranteed by player 1 in an
auxiliary game where he is restricted to play a non revealing strategy. This is why we concentrate here
on non revealing strategies, whereas the splitting lemma was used by Aumann and Maschler to construct
optimal strategies that were not non revealing.
In the following corollary, Σˆ(p) is viewed as a subset of the set of mixed strategies of player 1.
Corollary 6.8 The set of non revealing strategies of player 1 at p is convex.
Proof: Let σ1 and σ2 be in Σˆ(p), and let λ be in [0, 1]. Define the strategy σ of player 1 as follows:
with probability λ, play σ1 and with probability (1 − λ), play σ2. By point (1) of lemma 6.6, σ is non
revealing at p. 2
We will also need in section 7 more elaborate properties of non revealing strategies. We now define
two types of continuation strategies for player 1. Fix σ in Σ+ and p in ∆(K), and consider that player
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1 uses σ in the original game Γ∞(p). Although what follows is conceptually simple, we need numerous
notations to be precise.
We first define, for each n in IN and hn = (i1, ..., in) ∈ In s.t. IPp,σ(hn) > 0, the “expected continuation
strategy” σ(p, hn) of player 1 after stage n and the play of hn.
For every possible sequence of states up to stage n, hn = (k1, ..., kn) in K
n, we denote by ω(hn, h
n)
the finite history of states and actions of player 1 up to stage n: ω(hn, h
n) = (k1, i1, ..., kn, in). We
denote by σ(hn, h
n) the behavior strategy in Σ+ played by σ after ω(hn, h
n). We define σ(p, hn) in Σ
+ as
follows, similarly to the splitting procedure (the tilde now denoting random variables to avoid confusion):
if k˜1 = k, then choose h
n in Kn according to IPp,σ(h
n|hn, k˜n+1 = k) and play according to σ(hn, hn) (if
k˜1 = k s.t. IPp,σ(k˜n+1 = k, hn) = 0, just play arbitrarily).
σ(p, hn) has the following interesting property. For m in IN , (kn+1, in+1, ..., kn+m, in+m) ∈ (K × I)m,
define the events:
A = (k˜n+1 = kn+1, ı˜n+1 = in+1, ..., k˜n+m = kn+m, ı˜n+m = in+m)
and
B = (k˜1 = kn+1, ı˜1 = in+1, ..., k˜m = kn+m, ı˜m = in+m).
We have:
IPp,σ(A|hn) =
∑
k∈K
pkn(p, σ)(hn)IPp,σ(A|hn, k˜n+1 = k)
=
∑
k∈K
pkn(p, σ)(hn)
∑
hn∈Kn
IPp,σ(h
n|hn, k˜n+1 = k)IPp,σ(A|ω(hn, hn), k˜n+1 = k)
=
∑
k∈K
pkn(p, σ)(hn)
∑
hn∈Kn
IPp,σ(h
n|hn, k˜n+1 = k)IPδk ,σ(hn,hn)(B)
= IPpn(p,σ)(hn),σ(p,hn)(B)
The following lemma expresses some kind of subgame property of non revealing strategies, and will be
used later in the proof of proposition 7.4. Its proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 6.9 Let σ be in Σ+, and p be in ∆(K).
σ ∈ Σˆ(p) ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ IN, ∀hn ∈ In s.t. IPp,σ(hn) > 0, σ(p, hn) ∈ Σˆ(pn(p, σ)(hn))
In the same spirit, we now define for each n in IN the expected strategy σ(p, n+) of player 1 in Γ∞(p)
after stage n. If k˜1 = k, choose (hn, h
n) in In × Kn according to IPp,σ(ω(hn, hn)|k˜n+1 = k) and play
according to σ(hn, h
n) (if k˜1 = k such that IPp,σ(k˜n+1 = k) = 0, play arbitrarily).
Note that σ(p, 0+) is just σ (up to events with probability zero). For m in IN and
(kn+1, in+1, ..., kn+m, in+m) ∈ (K × I)m, define as before:
A = (k˜n+1 = kn+1, ı˜n+1 = in+1, ..., k˜n+m = kn+m, ı˜n+m = in+m)
and
B = (k˜1 = kn+1, ı˜1 = in+1, ..., k˜m = kn+m, ı˜m = in+m).
One has for each k in K:
IPp,σ(A|k˜n+1 = k) =
∑
(hn,hn)∈In×Kn
IPp,σ(ω(hn, h
n)|k˜n+1 = k)IPδk ,σ(hn,hn)(B)
Hence,
IPp,σ(A) =
∑
k∈K
IPp,σ(k˜n+1 = k)
∑
(hn,hn)∈In×Kn
IPp,σ(ω(hn, h
n)|k˜n+1 = k)IPδk ,σ(hn,hn)(B)
= IPpMn,σ(p,n+)(B)
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We then obtain that:
IPpMn,σ(p,n+)(B) = IPp,σ(A) =
∑
hn∈In
IPp,σ(hn)IPp,σ(A|hn)
=
∑
hn∈In
IPp,σ(hn)IPpn(p,σ)(hn),σ(p,hn)(B)
Consequently, IPpMn,σ(p,n+) =
∑
hn∈In IPp,σ(hn)IPpn(p,σ)(hn),σ(p,hn).
We now have an analog of lemma 6.9 for this type of continuation strategy, which will be used later
in the proof of proposition 7.7.
Lemma 6.10 Let σ be in Σ+ and p be in ∆(K).
σ ∈ Σˆ(p) ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ IN, σ(p, n+) ∈ Σˆ(pMn)
The proof can be found in the appendix. Finally we also need to define explicitly N -stage non revealing
strategies.
Definition 6.11 If σ = (σn)n≥1 is in Σˆ(p), the restriction of σ to the first N -stages, i.e. the strategy
(σn)n=1,...,N , is called a N -stage non revealing strategy for player 1 at p. We denote by ΣˆN (p) the set of
such strategies.
7. Non revealing games.
Definition 7.1 For p in ∆(K), the non revealing game at p, denoted by Γˆ∞(p), is the game obtained
from Γ∞(p) by restricting player 1 to play a strategy in Σˆ(p).
The notions of guaranteeing and value in Γˆ∞(p) are defined as in definition 2.1: one just has to replace
everywhere Γ∞(p) by Γˆ∞(p) and Σ by Σˆ(p). The N -stages non revealing games are defined as follows:
Definition 7.2 For N ≥ 1, the N -stage non revealing game at p is defined as the zero-sum game ΓˆN (p)
with strategy spaces ΣˆN (p) for player 1, TN for player 2 and with payoff function γpN for player 1.
We first study the value of the N -stage games.
Proposition 7.3 For each positive N , and probability p on K:
(1) ΓˆN (p) has a value, denoted by vˆN (p) and both players have optimal strategies.
(2) vˆN is an upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) mapping from ∆(K) to IR, and |vˆN (p)| ≤ C.
(3) For each q in Q, the restriction of vˆN to A(q) is concave.
Proof: ΓˆN (p) is the zero-sum game (ΣˆN (p), TN , γpN ). In the original N -stage game (ΣN , TN , γpN ), the
sets of mixed strategies of both players are the convex hull of a finite number of points, hence are convex
subsets of some Euclidean space. By corollary 6.8, ΣˆN (p) is a convex subset of ΣN (we always identify
mixed and behavior strategies). Since γpN is bilinear over ΣN ×TN , if we show that ΣˆN (p) is closed in ΣN
we can apply Sion’s theorem to obtain that ΓˆN (p) has a value and both players have optimal strategies.
Put H = ∪N−1n=0 Hˆn+1, and consider the mapping F from ∆(K) × Σ+N to (IRK)
H
such that for each
(p, σ) in ∆(K)× Σ+N , F (p, σ) is:(
IPp,σ(hn+1)
(
qkn+1(p, σ)(hn+1)− qkn(p, σ)(i1, ..., in)
))
k∈K,n=0,...,N−1,hn+1=(i1,...,in+1)∈Hˆn+1 .
It is clear that we have F (p, σ) = 0 if and only if σ ∈ ΣˆN (p).
For each (p, σ), each n in {0, ..., N − 1} and each hn+1 = (i1, ..., in+1) in Hˆn+1, we have:
IPp,σ(hn+1) (qn+1(p, σ)(hn+1)− qn(p, σ)(hn))
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= IPp,σ(hn+1) (pn+1(p, σ)(hn+1)B−1−n − pn(p, σ)(hn)B−n)
= (IPp,σ(hn+1, kn+2 = k))kB−1−n − IPp,σ(hn+1)IPp,σ(hn) (IPp,σ(hn, kn+1 = k))kB−n.
(with an obvious convention if IPp,σ(hn) = 0.)
The mapping ((p, σ) −→ IPp,σ(h)) being continuous for any finite history h in (K× I)N , F is continuous.
This implies that ΣˆN(p) is closed in Σ
+
N . Since Σ
+
N is a compact subset of ΣN , so is ΣˆN(p). Thus (1)
is proved by Sion’s theorem.
Secondly, the correspondence from ∆(K) to Σ+N which associates to each p the set ΣˆN (p) has a closed
graph. By a maximum theorem (see e.g. Aubin and Cellina [1, Theorem 5 p.52]), this easily implies that
vˆN is upper semi-continuous. |vˆn(p)| ≤ C being obvious, (2) is proved.
Finally, (3) is just a consequence of our “splitting lemma”: with the same notations as lemma 6.6,
choose for each s σs an optimal strategy of player 1 in ΣˆN (ps). 2
We can now write a recursive formula for vˆn (vˆ0 being defined arbitrarily). The proof is very similar
to that of proposition 5.1 and can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 7.4 For each n ≥ 1 and p in ∆(K),
vˆn(p) =
1
n
max
x∈NR(p)
min
y∈∆(J)
(
G(p, x, y) + (n− 1)
∑
i∈I
x(p)(i) vˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M)
)
=
1
n
min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈NR(p)
(
G(p, x, y) + (n− 1)
∑
i∈I
x(p)(i) vˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M)
)
As for vn, we have for each n ≥ 1 and p in ∆(K) that vˆn(p) ≥ 1n (u(p) + (n − 1)vˆn−1(pM)), and by
concavity of vˆn−1 on A(pMB0), vˆn(p) ≤ 1n (vˆ1(p)+(n−1)vˆn−1(pM)). Hence vˆn(p)−vˆn−1(pM) −→n→∞ 0.
As vˆn(p) = maxσ∈Σˆ(p) minτ∈T γ
p
n(σ, τ) it is also clear that vˆn(p) − vˆn−1(p) −→n→∞ 0. Thus vˆn(p) −
vˆn(pM) −→n→∞ 0. A main interest of the recursive formula for vˆn is the following corollary.
Corollary 7.5 For each n, vˆn is continuous.
Proof:
We first modify the recursive formula by changing variables. For any p in ∆(K) and x in NR(p), we
put z(p, x) = (pkxk(i))k∈K,i∈I ∈ (IRK)I . Define Z as the correspondence from ∆(K) to (IRK)I which
associates to each probability p the set {z(p, x), x ∈ NR(p)}.
For z = (zki )k∈K,i∈I in the non-negative orthant (IR
K)I+, we put for each i in I , z(i) =
∑
k∈K z
k
i and
zi = (z
k
i )k∈K ∈ IRK . ziz(i) is thus an element of ∆(K) (defined arbitrarily if z(i) = 0). Define finally
H(z) = miny∈∆(J)
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I z
k
i G
k(i, y).
The recursive formula becomes: ∀n ≥ 1, ∀p ∈ ∆(K),
vˆn(p) =
1
n
max
z∈Z(p)
(
H(z) + (n− 1)
∑
i∈I
z(i) vˆn−1(
zi
z(i)
M)
)
.
We have Z(p) = {z ∈ (IRK)I+,
∑
i∈I zi = p and ∀i ∈ i, ziB0 = z(i)pB0}, hence Z(p) is a polytope. H
is continuous, and if f : ∆(K) −→ IR is continuous, so is the mapping
(
z −→∑i∈I z(i)f( ziz(i)M)). If we
prove that the correspondence Z is continuous (i.e. lower and upper semi-continuous) then by induction
we obtain that vˆn is continuous for each n. As it is clear that Z has a compact graph, we just have to
show that Z is lower semi-continuous (l.s.c. for short).
Fix p in ∆(K) and z in Z(p). We put D = {(k, i) ∈ K × I, z(i)pk − zki > 0}. In order to prove that
Z is l.s.c., we will show that:
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∀p′ ∈ ∆(K), ∃z∗ ∈ Z(p′) with ‖z − z∗‖ ≤ ‖p− p′‖(1 + A/B),
where A =
∑
k∈K,i∈I |pkz(i)− zki | and B = min(k,i)∈D z(i)pk − zki , with the convention that A/B = 0 if
D = ∅.
First define z′ in (IRK)I s.t. for each i and k, z′ki = z
k
i + z(i)(p
′k− pk). We have ∑i∈I z′i = p′, for each
i in I , z′(i) = z(i), (z′i − z′(i)p′)B0 = 0 and ‖z − z′‖ = ‖p− p′‖. If D = ∅, z′ ∈ (IRK)I+ and we are done.
Assume now that z′ is not in (IRK)I+.
Define z′′ in (IRK)I+ such that for each i and k, z
′′k
i = p
′kz(i). z′′ belongs to Z(p′). Finally put, for
every λ in [0, 1], z(λ) = (1 − λ)z′ + λz′′. For each λ, z(λ) ∈ Z(p′) if and only if z(λ) has non-negative
coordinates.
Let λ∗ ∈ (0, 1] be max(k,i)∈D z(i)p
k−zki −z(i)p′k
z(i)pk−zk
i
. A simple computation shows that z(λ∗) ∈ (IRK)I+ and
that λ∗ ≤ ‖p− p′‖/B. Hence:
‖z(λ∗)− z‖ =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
|zki (λ∗)− zki |
=
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
|z(i)(p′k − pk) + λ∗pkz(i)− λ∗zki |
≤
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
z(i)|p′k − pk|+ λ∗
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
|pkz(i)− zki |
≤ ‖p− p′‖+ ‖p− p′‖A/B
This proves that Z is l.s.c., and we obtain that for each n, vˆn is continuous. 2
We can now study the non revealing games with infinitely many stages. We first define an auxiliary
mapping from ∆(K) to IR.
Definition 7.6 ∀p ∈ ∆(K), w(p) = infN≥1vˆNL(pB0).
As an infimum of continuous functions, w is u.s.c. on ∆(K). For each q in Q, it is constant on A(q).
w(p) will turn out to be the value of the non revealing game Γˆ∞(p). The following proposition is the
analog of proposition 5.5 for non revealing games.
Proposition 7.7 In any non revealing game Γˆ∞(p), player 2 can guarantee w(p).
Proof: Let N be a positive multiple of L, and define a strategy τ of player 2 as follows. Divide the set
of stages into consecutive blocks B1, ..., Bm, ... of length N . For each positive m, τ plays on block Bm
an optimal strategy τm in ΓˆN (pM
(m−1)N), independently on what happened at previous blocks.
Fix now σ a strategy for player 1 in Σˆ(p). At some block Bm, the expected payoff induced by p, σ
and τ at Bm is:
IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N
∑
n∈Bm G
kn(in, jn)
)
Since σ is independent of the moves of player 2, this payoff only depends on τm and on the stochas-
tic process induced by p and σ over the states and actions of player 1 at this block. But since
IPpM(m−1)N ,σ(p,(m−1)N+)(B) = IPp,σ(A) for any events A and B as before (see before lemma 6.10), we
have that:
IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N
∑
n∈Bm
Gkn(in, jn)
)
= IEpM(m−1)N ,σ(p,(m−1)N+),τm
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
Gkn(in, jn)
)
By lemma 6.10, σ(p, (m − 1)N+) is in Σˆ(pM (m−1)N ), hence by definition of τm, this expected payoff is
at most vˆN (pM
(m−1)N). Consequently, for each S:
γpNS(σ, τ) ≤
1
S
S∑
s=1
vˆN (pM
(s−1)N ),
and by concavity of vˆN on A(pB0), we get:
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γpNS(σ, τ) ≤ vˆN
(
1
S
S∑
s=1
pM (s−1)N
)
.
vˆN being continuous by corollary 7.5, the right-hand side converges to vˆN (pB0) as S goes to infinity,
and this convergence is uniform in σ. We have obtained:
∀ε > 0 ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0 ∀σ ∈ Σˆ(p) γpT (σ, τ) ≤ vˆN (pB0) + ε. 2
Note that the previous proof also directly gives the following interesting property.
Proposition 7.8 Let p be in ∆(K), S and N be positive integers with N a multiple of L. Then:
vˆNS(p) ≤ 1
S
S∑
s=1
vˆN (pM
(s−1)N ).
For each q in Q, we have qML = q, hence the previous proposition gives : ∀N ≥ 1, ∀S ≥ 1,
vˆLNS(q) ≤ vˆLN (q). We obtain the following corollary, which will be used later in section 9.
Corollary 7.9 For each q in Q, (vˆL2N (q))N≥1 is non-increasing.
We can now also prove the convergence of the value of the N -stage games.
Corollary 7.10 For each p in ∆(K), vˆN (p) −→N→∞ w(p).
Proof:
For each p in ∆(K), by proposition 7.7 player 2 can guarantee w(p) in Γˆ∞(p), hence: lim supN vˆN (p) ≤
w(p).
Consequently, for each q in Q:
lim supN vˆN (q) ≤ infN vˆNL(q).
so vˆNL(q) −→N→∞ w(q). As vˆN (q)− vˆN−1(q) −→n→∞ 0, we obtain vˆN (q) −→N→∞ w(q).
Define now, for each p in ∆(K), v(p) = lim infN vˆN (p). As for each p in ∆(K), vˆN (p) −
vˆN (pM) −→N→∞ 0, we have for each N , v(p) = v(pM) = ... = v(pMN).
Fix finally p in ∆(K), and put q = pB0 ∈ Q. Since for each N vˆN is concave on A(q) so is v. Since
A(q) is a polytope, v is then necessarily l.s.c. on A(q) (a reference for this is Mertens et al , part A, p.46,
ex. 15). As pMNL −→N→∞ q, we get that v(p) ≥ v(q) = w(q).
Summing, we obtain that lim supN vˆN (p) ≤ w(p) = w(q) ≤ v(p), and the corollary is proved. 2
We can now conclude about the value of the non revealing games.
Theorem 7.11 For each p in ∆(K), the non revealing game Γˆ∞(p) has a value which is w(p).
Proof: Fix p in ∆(K), and put q = pB0, and w = w(p). By proposition 7.7, we just have to prove that
player 1 can guarantee w(p) in Γˆ∞(p).
A(q) is a polytope and for each N vˆN is concave on A(q), hence by the previous corollary we can
obtain:
∀ε > 0 ∃N0 ∀N ≥ N0 ∀p′ ∈ A(q) vˆN (p′) ≥ w − ε.
Fix now ε > 0, and let N0 be as above. Divide the set of stages into consecutive blocks B
1,...,Bm,...
of length N0L. We define σ by induction on the blocks as follows:
- at block B1, σ plays an optimal strategy in ΓˆN0L(p).
- at block Bm, σ is defined as follows: if h(m−1)N0L in Hˆ(m−1)N0L has been played by player 1 at
previous blocks, put pm = p(m−1)N0L(p, σ)(h(m−1)N0L). Notice that pm only depends on the definition
of σ on previous blocks. σ plays at block Bm after h(m−1)N0L an optimal strategy in ΓˆN0L(pm).
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By proposition 6.5, σ is a non revealing strategy at p. And for each m and h(m−1)N0L such that
IPp,σ(h(m−1)N0L) > 0, p(m−1)N0L(p, σ)(h(m−1)N0L) is in A(q). Consequently, for any strategy τ of player
2, we have:
∀m ≥ 1, IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N0L
∑
n∈Bm
Gkn(in, jn)
)
≥ w − ε.
Hence: ∃N1 ∀N ≥ N1∀τ ∈ T , γpN (σ, τ) ≥ w − 2ε. 2
8. Player 1 can guarantee cavw(pB0) in the original game. We investigate here what can
be guaranteed by player 1 in the original game. By theorem 7.11, player 1 can guarantee w(p) =
infN≥1vˆNL(pB0) in the non revealing game Γˆ∞(p). Thus a fortiori player 1 can guarantee w(p) in
Γ∞(p). We now define another mapping from ∆(K) to IR.
Definition 8.1 ∀p ∈ ∆(K), w∗(p) = cavw(pB0).
Notice that (w(p) = w(pB0) ∀p) does not necessarily imply (cavw(p) = cavw(pB0) ∀p). Recall that if f
is an u.s.c. mapping from ∆(K) to IR, then cavf is continuous and for each p in ∆(K), cavf(p) is:
max{
∑
s∈S
λsf(ps), S finite set , ∀s ∈ S λs ≥ 0, ps ∈ ∆(K),
∑
s∈S
λs = 1,
∑
s∈S
λsps = p}.
By Caratheodory’s theorem, one can show (see e.g. Rockafellar [12, corollary 17.1.5 p.157]) that the
finite set S in the above maximum can always be chosen with cardinality |K|. So we may impose
S = {1, ..., |K|} = K in the above expression.
Lemma 8.2 Let f be an u.s.c. mapping from ∆(K) to IR such that for each p in ∆(K), player 1 can
guarantee f(p) in Γ∞(p). Then for each p in ∆(K), player 1 can guarantee cavf(pB0).
Proof: By the splitting procedure (see remark 6.7, or e.g. Zamir [20]), it is standard that for all p
player 1 can guarantee cavf(p) in Γ∞(p). As cavf is continuous, to prove the lemma we show that if
g : ∆(K) −→ IR is continuous and if for each p player 1 can guarantee g(p) in Γ∞(p), then for each p he
can guarantee g(pB0) in Γ∞(p).
Fix p in ∆(K), and ε > 0. For N ≥ 1, let σN in Σ be a strategy of player 1 such that: ∃T0 ∀T ≥ T0
∀τ ∈ T , γpMNT (σN , τ) ≥ g(pMN)−ε. Define σ(N) as follows: play arbitrarily independently of the states
up to stage N , then play according to σN . It is clear that σ(N) guarantees g(pM
N) - ε in Γ∞(p). For N
multiple of L and large enough, σ(N) thus guarantees g(pB0)− 2ε in Γ∞(p). 2
As player 1 can guarantee w(p) in Γ∞(p) for each p, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 8.3 In Γ∞(p), player 1 can guarantee w∗(p).
9. Value of the original game By proposition 5.5 and by corollary 8.3, we know that for each p
in ∆(K), in the game Γ∞(p):
player 2 can guarantee v∗(p) = limn→∞vn(p) = infN≥1vNL(pB0).
player 1 can guarantee w∗(p) = cavw(pB0),
where w(p) = limn→∞vˆn(p) = infN≥1vˆNL(pB0).
We finally show that v∗(p) = w∗(p), proving that Γ∞(p) has a value. This is done in two steps. First,
we show that v∗(p) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0). Then we will prove that infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0) = cavw(pB0).
The following proposition establishes the link between the limit of the values of the N -stage original
games and the values of the N -stage non revealing games. Indeed, it justifies our definition of non
revealing games.
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Proposition 9.1 For p in ∆(K) and N ≥ 1, v∗(p) ≤ cavvˆNL(pB0).
We first roughly explain the ideas of the proof. Fix N a multiple of L, we have to show that
v∗(p) ≤ cavvˆN (pB0). Consider a strategy σ of player 1 which is optimal in a NT -stage game ΓNT (p),
with T large. We construct a strategy τ for player 2 such that γpNT (σ, τ) ≤ f(N,T ), where f satisfies
lim supT f(N,T ) ≤ cavvˆN (pB0). σ need not be non revealing at p, but since (qn(p, σ))n≥0 is a martin-
gale, we know by the classical bound on its L1 variation (see for example [20, p.122]), that for each
S, 1
S
∑S−1
s=0 IEp,σ (‖qs+1(p, σ)− qs(p, σ)‖) ≤ |K|√S , hence is small when S is large. The NT stages will be
viewed as T blocks of length N . At the beginning of each block m, player 2 will compute his belief
pm on the current state and the N -stage strategy σm to be played at this block by player 1 using σ.
(pm, σm) will be approximated by a non revealing pair (pˆm, σˆm), and player 2 will play at block Bm a
best response against σˆm in the non revealing game ΓˆN (pˆm). Then player 1’s payoff at this block will be
at most vˆN (pˆm) plus an error term depending of ‖(pm, σm) − (pˆm, σˆm)‖. By the previous bound, it will
be possible to control the average error term and to show that it vanishes as T goes to infinity. And we
obtain the upper bound of cavvˆN (pB0) by collecting the expected average of the non revealing N -stage
values.We now formally prove proposition 9.1.
Proof:
Let N be a positive multiple of L. N will remain fixed in all what follows, and we will prove that :
∀p ∈ ∆(K), v∗(p) ≤ cavvˆN (pB0).
(1) It will be convenient to consider the following subset Σ¯N of N -stages behavior strategies of player 1.
A strategy σ = (σn)n=1,...,N in ΣN is in Σ¯N if at each stage n, σn only depends on player 1’s past actions
i1,...,in−1 and on the current state kn. By proposition 5.1, for each p player 1 has an optimal strategy in
ΓN (p) which belongs to Σ¯N .
We need to be precise about the strategy spaces and the norms we will use. Recall that if x = (xs)s∈S
is an element of an Euclidean space IRS , we use ‖x‖ = ∑s∈S |xs|. We view ∆(I) as a subset of IRI . An
element σ in Σ¯N can then be seen as a particular mapping from ∪Nn=1(K × I × J)n−1 ×K to IRI , hence
as an element of the Euclidean space (IRI)∪
N
n=1(K×I×J)n−1×K . One can find a positive constant C1 ≥ C
such that for all σ and σ′ in Σ¯N , for each p in ∆(K) and τ in TN , we have:
|γpN (σ, τ) − γpN (σ′, τ)| ≤ C1‖σ − σ′‖.
Notice that C1 depends on N .
Denote by R the set ∆(K)× Σ¯N . If (p, σ) and (p′, σ′) are elements of R, we use: ‖(p, σ)− (p′, σ′)‖ =
‖p− p′‖+ ‖σ − σ′‖, where ‖p− p′‖ =∑k∈K |pk − p′k|. R is thus compact.
As in the proof of proposition 7.3, we put H = ∪N−1n=0 Hˆn+1. We consider the following mapping F
from R to (IRK)H such that for each (p, σ) in ∆(K)× Σ¯N , F (p, σ) is:
(IPp,σ(hn+1) (qn+1(p, σ)(hn+1)− qn(p, σ)(i1, ..., in)))n=0,...,N−1,hn+1=(i1,...,in+1)∈Hˆn+1 .
For (p, σ) in R, we have F (p, σ) = 0 if and only if σ ∈ ΣˆN (p), and we define Rˆ = {(p, σ) ∈ R, F (p, σ) = 0}.
F is continuous as in the proof of proposition 7.3, so Rˆ is compact. Notice that for (p, σ) in R we have:
‖F (p, σ)‖ =
N−1∑
n=0
IEp,σ (‖qn+1(p, σ)− qn(p, σ)‖) .
(2) Fix now ε > 0.
Assume that for each t > 0, one can find (pt, σt) in R such that: ∀(pˆ, σˆ) ∈ Rˆ, ‖(pt, σt) − (pˆ, σˆ)‖ >
ε+ t‖F (pt, σt)‖. By compacity of R and continuity of F , one can consider a cluster point of the sequence
(pt, σt)t and obtain the existence of some element (p
∗, σ∗) in R satisfying: ∀(pˆ, σˆ) ∈ Rˆ, ‖(p∗, σ∗)−(pˆ, σˆ)‖ ≥
ε > 0, and ‖F (p∗, σ∗)‖ = 0. This is impossible by definition of Rˆ. Consequently, one can find a positive
constant C2, depending on N and ε, such that:
∀(p, σ) ∈ R, ∃(pˆ, σˆ) ∈ Rˆ, ‖(p, σ)− (pˆ, σˆ)‖ ≤ ε+ C2‖F (p, σ)‖.
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(3) Now comes the main part of the proof. N and ε being fixed as before, we also fix an element p in
∆(K) in all what follows. Let C1 = C1(N) and C2 = C2(N, ε) be defined as in points (1) and (2).
Let now T be a positive integer, and let σ in Σ¯NT (i.e. σ is in ΣNT and only depends on past actions
and on the current state) be an optimal strategy for player 1 in ΓNT (p). (qn(p, σ))n≥1 is, with respect
to IPp,σ , a martingale with values in ∆(K), so we have the usual bound:
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
IEp,σ (‖qn+1(p, σ)− qn(p, σ)‖) ≤ |K|√
NT
.
We define τ a NT -stage strategy of player 2 as follows. Divide the set of stages into consecutive
blocks B1,..., BT of length N . For m ∈ {1, ..., T}, τ plays at block Bm = {(m − 1)N + 1, ...,mN}
as follows: if hm = (i1, ..., i(m−1)N) ∈ Hˆ(m−1)N has been played by player 1 at previous blocks, let
pm(hm) = p(m−1)N(p, σ)(hm) in ∆(K) be player 2’s belief on the state of the beginning of block Bm.
Consider the strategy σm(hm) played by player 1 using σ at block B
m after hm has occurred. σm(hm)
belongs to Σ¯N , so it is possible to choose some (pˆm(hm), σˆm(hm)) in Rˆ such that: ‖(pˆm(hm), σˆm(hm))−
(pm(hm), σm(hm))‖ ≤ ε + C2‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖. At block Bm after hm, τ plays a best response
τm(hm) against σˆm(hm) in the non revealing game ΓˆN (pˆm(hm)).
By definition of σ, γpNT (σ, τ) ≥ vNT (p). We now compute an upper bound for γpNT (σ, τ). Let m be in
{1, ..., T} and hm be in Hˆ(m−1)N .
IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N
∑
n∈Bm
Gkn(in, jn)
∣∣hm
)
= γ
pm(hm)
N (σm(hm), τm(hm))
≤ C‖pm(hm)− pˆm(hm)‖+ γ pˆm(hm)N (σm(hm), τm(hm))
≤ C‖pm(hm)− pˆm(hm)‖+ γ pˆm(hm)N (σˆm(hm), τm(hm)) + C1‖(σm(hm)− σˆ(hm)‖
≤ C1 (ε+ C2‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖) + vˆN (pˆm(hm)),
since σˆm(hm) is non revealing at pˆm(hm) and τm(hm) is optimal in ΓˆN (pˆm(hm)).
Consequently, if we condition on all possible histories hm we obtain that at block B
m player 1’s payoff
IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N
∑
n∈Bm G
kn(in, jn)
)
is at most:
∑
hm∈Hˆ(m−1)N
IPp,σ(hm) (C1ε+ C1C2‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖+ vˆN (pˆm(hm))) .
We have
∑
hm∈Hˆ(m−1)N IPp,σ(hm)pm(hm) = pM
(m−1)N , and we put p¯m =∑
hm∈Hˆ(m−1)N IPp,σ(hm)pˆm(hm). Since cavvˆN is concave and above vˆN we obtain that
IEp,σ,τ
(
1
N
∑
n∈Bm G
kn(in, jn)
)
is at most:
C1ε+ C1C2
∑
hm∈Hˆ(m−1)N
IPp,σ(hm)‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖+ cavvˆN (p¯m).
Summing up over blocks, we get:
γpNT (σ, τ) ≤ C1ε+ C1C2
1
T
T∑
m=1
∑
hm∈Hˆ(m−1)N
IPp,σ(hm)‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖+ 1
T
T∑
m=1
cavvˆN (p¯m).
We now bound the second and third terms on the right-hand side.
First, for each m and hm in Hˆ(m−1)N we have:
‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖ =
N−1∑
n=0
IEpm(hm),σm(hm)(‖qn+1(pm(hm), σm(hm))− qn(pm(hm), σm(hm))‖)
=
∑
n∈Bm
IEp,σ(‖qn+1(p, σ)− qn(p, σ)‖ |hm))
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Thus we get:
1
T
T∑
m=1
∑
hm∈Hˆ(m−1)N
IPp,σ(hm)‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm))‖ = 1
T
NT−1∑
n=0
IEp,σ (‖qn+1(p, σ)− qn(p, σ)‖)
≤ |K|
√
N√
T
.
Secondly, we have 1
T
∑T
m=1 cavvˆN (p¯m) ≤ cavvˆN ( 1T
∑T
m=1 p¯m) and :
‖ 1
T
T∑
m=1
p¯m − 1
T
T∑
m=1
pM (m−1)N‖ = ‖ 1
T
T∑
m=1
∑
hm
IPp,σ(hm)(pm(hm)− pˆm(hm))‖
≤ 1
T
T∑
m=1
∑
hm
IPp,σ(hm)(ε+ C2‖F (pm(hm), σm(hm)‖)
≤ ε+ C2 |K|
√
N√
T
.
Summing up, we have obtained:
γpNT (σ, τ) ≤ C1ε+
C1C2|K|
√
N√
T
+ cavvˆN (
1
T
T∑
m=1
p¯m)
where ‖ 1
T
∑T
m=1 p¯m − 1T
∑T
m=1 pM
(m−1)N‖ ≤ ε+ C2 |K|
√
N√
T
.
cavvˆN being continuous, we then have that vNT (p) is at most:
C1ε+
C1C2|K|
√
N√
T
+ max
{
cavvˆN (p
′), p′ s.t. ‖p′ − 1
T
T∑
m=1
pM (m−1)N‖ ≤ ε+ C2 |K|
√
N√
T
}
.
Recall that N , ε, C1 and C2 are fixed.
1
T
∑T
m=1 pM
(m−1)N −→T→∞ pB0, so one can find T0 such that
for each T ≥ T0:
vNT (p) ≤ C1ε+ C1C2|K|
√
N√
T
+ max{cavvˆN (p′), p′ s.t. ‖p′ − pB0‖ ≤ 3ε}.
And we obtain:
v∗(p) = lim sup
T
vNT (p) ≤ C1ε+ max{cavvˆN (p′), p′ s.t. ‖p′ − pB0‖ ≤ 3ε}.
(4) We can now conclude the proof of proposition 9.1. The above inequality holds for each ε > 0. Since
C1 does not depend on ε and cavvˆN is continuous, we have v
∗(p) ≤ cavvˆN (pB0) as wanted. 2
Corollary 9.2 For each p in ∆(K),
v∗(p) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0) = limN→∞cavvˆNL(pB0).
proof: By the previous proposition, for each p we have v∗(p) ≤ infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0). For each N ,
vN is concave and above vˆN , hence we obtain: infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0) ≥ v∗(p) = limN→∞vN (pB0) ≥
lim supN→∞ cavvˆN (pB0). Thus (cavvˆNL(pB0))N converges to infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0) = v
∗(p). 2
It now just remains to show that w∗(p) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0). We start with a lemma, which proof
can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 9.3 Let (fn)n≥1 be a non-increasing sequence of u.s.c. mappings from ∆(K) to IR pointwise
converging to some mapping f from ∆(K) to IR. Then the sequence (cavfn)n≥1 uniformly converges to
cavf .
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Proposition 9.4 For each p in ∆(K),
w∗(p) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0).
Proof: As w(p) = infN≥1vˆNL(pB0), it is clear that w∗(p) ≤ infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0). We define, for each
positive n, two mappings fn and un from ∆(K) to IR such that for each p, fn(p) = vˆ2nL(pB0) and
un(p) = vˆ2nL(p). Notice that cavfn(p) may not be cavvˆ2nL(pB0).
1. For each n, fn is continuous and (fn)n pointwise converges to w. By corollary 7.9, (fn)n is non-
increasing so by lemma 9.3, we first obtain that (cavfn)n≥1 uniformly converges to cavf . In particular,
for each p in ∆(K) we have:
cavfn(p) −→n→∞ cavw(p).
2. By proposition 7.8, we also have: ∀p ∈ ∆(K), ∀N ≥ 1, ∀T ≥ 1:
vˆNLT (p) ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
vˆNL(pM
(t−1)NL).
vˆNL being concave on A(pB0), we obtain:
vˆNLT (p) ≤ vˆNL
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
pM (t−1)NL
)
.
Hence: ∀N ≥ 1, ∀T ≥ 1,
vˆL2N2T (p) ≤ vˆL2N

 1
2T
2T∑
t=1
pM (t−1)2
NL

 ,
uN+T (p) ≤ uN

 1
2T
2T∑
t=1
pM (t−1)2
NL

 .
Fix N ≥ 1 and ε > 0. uN being uniformly continuous, one can find T0 such that: ∀T ≥ T0,
∀p ∈ ∆(K), uN+T (p) ≤ uN(pB0) + ε = fN (p) + ε. Thus for each p in ∆(K) and T ≥ T0, we have
cavuN+T (p) ≤ cavfN(p) + ε, and so cavuN+T (pB0) ≤ cavfN (pB0) + ε. Hence:
cavfN(pB0) + ε ≥ infT cavuN+T (pB0)
≥ infT cavvˆTL(pB0).
We have obtained: ∀N ≥ 1 , ∀ε > 0, ∀p ∈ ∆(K), infT cavvˆTL(pB0) ≤ cavfN (pB0) + ε. Thus
infT cavvˆTL(pB0) ≤ infNcavfN(pB0), and this last quantity is just cavw(pB0) by point 1. Consequently,
w∗(p) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0). 2
It just remains to conclude.
Proof of Theorem 2.3 By proposition 5.5, player 2 can guarantee v∗(p) in Γ∞(p). By corollary 8.3,
player 1 can guarantee w∗(p) = cavw(pB0) in Γ∞(p). By corollary 9.2 and proposition 9.4, v∗(p) =
infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0) = w∗(p). Hence Γ∞(p) has a value which is:
v∗(p) = w∗(p) = cavw(pB0) = infN≥1cavvˆNL(pB0).
And player 2 has an optimal strategy by remark 5.7. 2
10. Concluding Remarks.
1. Observation of player 1
A) The fact that player 1 observes after each stage the action played by player 2 plays no role. Hence
if player 1 does not observe these actions, or just imperfectly observes them, the game still has the same
value.
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B) Assume now that player 1 observes at the beginning of stage 1 the whole sequence of states k1,
k2,..., kn,.... Then the N -stage values vN (p) still satisfy the same recursive formula given by proposition
5.1, and player 2 can still guarantee their limit as shown by proposition 5.5. Hence again this modified
game has the same value (idem if player 1 observes the sequence of states in any manner such that, for
each n, player 1 knows the state kn before choosing his action of stage n).
2. Optimal strategy for player 1
By slightly improving the proof of theorem 7.11, one can show that player 1 has a strategy σ that
guarantees w(p) in Γˆ∞(p) (just play by consecutive blocks Bm of length mL, and at Bm play an optimal
strategy in ΓˆmL(pm), if pm is the belief of player 2 on the current state at the beginning of the block).
w being u.s.c., by the splitting procedure one can construct σ that guarantees cavw(p) in Γ∞(p). But it
is unclear whether there exists σ that guarantees the value cavw(pB0) for player 1, hence the existence
of an optimal strategy for player 1 in Γ∞(p) is an open question.
3. Values of the N-stage games
A) The proof of proposition 9.1 gives no useful bound on the speed of convergence of (vN (p))N to
v∗(p), contrary to the Aumann-Maschler case where this convergence is according to 1/
√
N .
B) It is unclear whether vˆN , even vˆ1, is Lipschitz or not. A proof of this would simplify things and
give insights for the previous points.
4. Computing the value
The value is not easy to compute, even in a simple example such as: K = {a, b}, M =
(
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
)
,
Ga =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and Gb =
(
0 0
0 1
)
.
Very recently, A. Marino [8] and Horner et al. [6]gave independent and different proofs for this case,
obtaining that: v∞(p) = 0.4 for each p. Keeping the same payoffs, Horner et al. compute the value for
any transition matrix M =
(
α 1− α
1− α α
)
, with 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 2/3. The case α = 3/4 appears more
difficult, and now seems a challenging example.
5. Generalizations
An interesting generalization is the case where player 2 observes after each stage a signal depending on
the action just played by player 1 and on the current state. Is it possible, as in the Aumann Maschler’s
case, to generalize to this setup the definition of non revealing strategies in order to get the existence of
the value ?
Another generalization, focussing on the stochastic game aspect, is the case where at each stage the
current state is chosen according to a probability distribution depending on the previous state and on
the actions just played by both players. However, it is known (Sorin [18]) that the value may fail to
exist in this general case. But in the intermediate case where the transitions do not depend on player
2’s actions, what about the existence of the value ?
Appendix A.
Proof of proposition 5.1 It goes by induction on n. The result holds for n = 1 by definition of Γ1(p).
Fix n ≥ 2, and assume that the proposition holds for n − 1 and all p. Fix p in ∆(K) and consider the
game Γn(p).
We define an auxiliary zero-sum game An(p) with strategy spaces ∆(I)
K for player 1 and
∆(J) for player 2, and payoff function for player 1 defined by: f pn(x, y) =
1
n
(G(p, x, y) + (n −
1)
∑
i∈I x(p)(i)vn−1(pˆ(x, i)M)) for all x in ∆(I)
K and y in ∆(J).
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Consider x = λx′+(1−λ)x′′, with λ ∈ [0, 1] and x′, x′′ in ∆(I)K . For each i, we have x(p)(i) pˆ(x, i) =
λx′(p)(i) pˆ(x′, i) + (1− λ)x′′(p)(i) pˆ(x′′, i), hence by concavity of vn−1,
x(p)(i) vn−1(pˆ(x, i)M) ≥ λx′(p)(i) vn−1(pˆ(x′, i)M) + (1− λ)x′′(p)(i) vn−1(pˆ(x′′, i)M).
This shows that fpn is concave in x. As it is convex in y and continuous, by Sion’s theorem [16], An(p)
has a value that we denote by fn(p).
We now formally prove that player 1 can guarantee fn(p) in Γn(p). Let σ in Σn be as follows: - at
stage 1, play some x∗ optimal for player 1 in An(p). - if i in I is the action played at stage 1, play from
stage 2 to stage n an optimal strategy σi for player 1 in the game Γn−1(pˆ(x, i)M). Let τ be in T , and
denote by y in ∆(J) the mixed action played by τ at stage 1 and for each (i, j) ∈ I × J , by τi,j the
strategy played by player 2 using τ at stages 2,...,n if (i, j) is played at stage 1. We have:
γpn(σ, τ) =
1
n
(
G(p, x∗, y) + (n− 1)IEp,σ,τ
(
1
n−1
∑n
n′=2G
kn′ (in′ , jn′)
))
and IEp,σ,τ
(
1
n−1
∑n
n′=2G
kn′ (in′ , jn′
)
=
∑
i,j,k
x∗(p)(i)y(j)IPp,σ,τ (k2 = k|i1 = i)IEp,σ,τ
(
1
n− 1
n∑
n′=2
Gkn′ (in′ , jn′)
∣∣∣∣∣ k2 = k, i1 = i, j1 = j
)
=
∑
i∈I x
∗(p)(i)
∑
j∈J y(j)γ
pˆ(x∗,i)M
n−1 (σi, τi,j),
since (IPp,σ,τ (k2 = k|i1 = i))k∈K = pˆ(x∗, i)M for all i.
For each i and j we have by definition of σi: γ
pˆ(x∗,i)M
n−1 (σi, τi,j) ≥ vn−1(pˆ(x∗, i)M). Hence
γpn(σ, τ) ≥ fpn(x∗, y) ≥ fn(p), and vn(p) ≥ fn(p).
It is similarly possible to show that player 2 can defend fn(p) in Γn(p). Fix σ in Σ, and denote by x
in ∆(I)K the strategy induced by σ at stage 1. Define τ as follows: - at stage 1, play y∗ in ∆(J) such
that: G(p, x, y∗) = miny∈∆(J)G(p, x, y), -at stages 2 to n, if i has been played at stage 1 by player 1,
play τi optimal in the game Γn−1(pˆ(x, i)M). Similar computations as before show that γpn(σ, τ) ≤ fn(p).
Finally vn(p) ≤ fn(p), thus vn(p) = fn(p).
An optimal strategy for player 1 in Γn(p) can be constructed as follows: at each stage n
′, compute
the belief p′ of player 2 on the current state (depending on the actions i1, ..., in′−1 previously played by
player 1), and play according to some x optimal in the zero-sum game An−n′+1(p′). This strategy only
depends on his own past actions i1, ..., in′−1 and on the current state kn′ . 2
Proof of lemma 6.9
⇐= just take n = 0.
=⇒ Assume that σ is in Σˆ(p), let n be in IN , and let hn = (i1, ..., in) ∈ In be such that IPp,σ(hn) > 0.
We have, by definition of Σˆ(p), pn(p, σ)(hn)B−n = pB0, and have to show that σ(p, hn) ∈ Σˆ(pn(p, σ)(hn)).
We put for simplicity σ′ = σ(p, hn) and p′ = pn(p, σ)(hn).
Fix m in IN , and h(m) = (in+1, ..., in+m) in I
m. Put ω = (i1, ..., in, in+1, ..., in+m), A = (˜ın+1 =
in+1, ..., ı˜n+m = in+m), and B = (˜ı1 = in+1, ..., ı˜m = in+m).
Assume that IPp′ ,σ′(B) > 0. We have to show that pm(p
′, σ′)(h(m))B−m = p′B0. IPp,σ(ω) =
IPp,σ(hn)IPp,σ(A|hn) = IPp,σ(hn)IPp′ ,σ′(B) > 0. Since σ is in Σˆ(p), pn+m(p, σ)(ω)B−n−m = pB0. For
each k in K,
IPp,σ(ω, k˜n+m+1 = k) = IPp,σ(hn)IPp,σ(A, k˜n+m+1 = k|hn)
= IPp,σ(hn)IPp′,σ′(B, k˜m+1 = k)
So we obtain:
pkn+m(p, σ)(ω) =
IPp′,σ′ (B,k˜m+1=k)
IPp′,σ′ (B)
= pkm(p
′, σ′)(h(m)).
Hence pm(p
′, σ′)(h(m))B−n−m = pn+m(p, σ)(ω)B−n−m = pB0 = p′B−n. Multiplying by Mn both sides,
we obtain that pm(p
′, σ′)(h(m))B−m = p′B0. 2
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Proof of lemma 6.10 ⇐= is clear. We prove the =⇒ part.
Let n be in IN . Put p′ = pMn, and σ′ = σ(p, n+). We have:
IPp′,σ′ =
∑
hn∈In IPp,σ(hn)IPpn(p,σ)(hn),σ(p,hn).
p′ =
∑
hn∈In IPp,σ(hn)pn(p, σ)(hn).
For each hn such that IPp,σ(hn) > 0, by the previous lemma σ(p, hn) ∈ Σˆ(pn(p, σ)(hn)) and since σ ∈ Σˆ(p),
pn(p, σ)(hn)B−n = pB0. Hence pn(p, σ)(hn)B0 = pn(p, σ)(hn)B−nMn = pMnB0, and pn(p, σ)(hn) ∈
A(pMnB0). By lemma 6.6, part (1), σ(p, n+) ∈ Σˆ(pMn). 2
Proof of proposition 7.4 For n = 1, the result is clear since a strategy σ in Σˆ1(p) can be seen as an
element of NR(p) by proposition 6.5. Fix n ≥ 2, and assume that the proposition holds for n− 1 for all
p. Fix p in ∆(K).
Define the auxiliary zero-sum game Aˆn(p) with strategy spaces NR(p) for player 1 and ∆(J) for player
2, and payoff function for player 1 defined by: fˆpn(x, y) =
1
n
(G(p, x, y)+(n−1)∑i∈I x(p)(i)vˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M))
for all x in NR(p) and y in ∆(J). We are going to apply Sion’s theorem to prove that Aˆn(p) has a value.
x being fixed, (y −→ fˆpn(x, y)) is affine hence convex and continuous. Consider x = λx′ + (1 − λ)x′′,
with λ ∈ [0, 1] and x′, x′′ in NR(p). For each i s.t. x′(p)(i) > 0 and x′′(p)(i) > 0, we have
pˆ(x, i)M = λx
′(p)(i)
x(p)(i) pˆ(x
′, i)M + (1−λ)x
′′(p)(i)
x(p)(i) pˆ(x
′′, i)M , and by definition of NR(p), pˆ(x′, i)B0M =
pB0M = pˆ(x
′′, i)B0M . Since B0M = MB0, we obtain that pˆ(x′, i)M , pˆ(x′′, i)M and pˆ(x, i)M all belong
to A(pMB0). By concavity of vˆn−1 on A(pMB0),
x(p)(i) vˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M) ≥ λx′(p)(i) vˆn−1(pˆ(x′, i)M) + (1− λ)x′′(p)(i) vˆn−1(pˆ(x′′, i)M).
This proves that fˆpn is concave in x. Consider now a sequence (xt)t of elements in NR(p) converg-
ing to some x. For each i s.t. x(p)(i) > 0, pˆ(xt, i) −→t→∞ pˆ(x, i) hence, since vˆn−1 is u.s.c.,
lim supt
∑
i∈I x(pt)(i)vˆn−1(pˆ(xt, i)M) ≤
∑
i∈I x(p)(i)vˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M). This shows that y being fixed,
(x −→ fˆpn(x, y)) is upper semi-continuous. By Sion’s theorem, Aˆn(p) has a value that we denote by
fˆn(p).
We now show that fˆn(p) is the value of Γˆn(p). As in the proof of proposition 5.1, we define σ in ΣN
as follows: - at stage 1, play some x∗ optimal for player 1 in Aˆn(p). - from stage 2 to n, if i in I is the
action played at stage 1, play an optimal strategy σi for player 1 in the game Γˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M). Using
proposition 6.5, one can see that σ is non revealing at p. As in the proof of proposition 5.1, σ guarantees
fˆn(p) in Γˆn(p). Similarly, we show that player 2 can defend fˆn(p) in Γˆn(p). Fix σ in ΣˆN (p), and denote
by x in NR(p) the strategy induced by σ at stage 1. For each i in I s.t. x(p)(i) > 0, the strategy induced
by σ at stage 2 to n if i has been played at stage 1 is in Σˆn−1(pˆ(x, i)M) by lemma 6.9. Consequently one
can construct, as in the proof of proposition 5.1, a strategy τ for player 2 satisfying γpn(σ, τ) ≤ fˆn(p). 2
Proof of lemma 9.3 Fix p in ∆(K). It is plain that limncavfn(p) ≥ cavf(p). One can take a fixed
finite set S, e.g. S = {1, ..., |K|}, satisfying: for each n ≥ 1, there exists (pns )s∈S , (λns )s∈S such that for
each s in S, pns ∈ ∆(K), λns ≥ 0,
∑
s∈S λ
n
s = 1,
∑
s∈S λ
n
s p
n
s = p and cavfn(p) =
∑
s∈S λ
n
s fn(p
n
s ). Taking
converging subsequences, one can find an increasing mapping ψ from the set of positive integers to itself,
(λs)s∈S and (ps)s∈S s.t. for each s in S, λ
ψ(n)
s −→n→∞ λs and pψ(n)s −→n→∞ ps.
Then for each n0 ≥ 1 we have for each n ≥ n0:
cavfψ(n)(p) =
∑
s∈S
λψ(n)s fψ(n)(p
ψ(n)
s )
≤
∑
s∈S
λψ(n)s fn0(p
ψ(n)
s ),
since (fn)n≥1 is non-increasing. So infn≥1cavfψ(n)(p) ≤
∑
s∈S λsfn0(ps), since fn0 is u.s.c.
Hence cavf(p) ≤ infn≥1cavfn(p) ≤
∑
s∈S λsfn0(ps) for each n0 ≥ 1. Thus cavf(p) ≤ infn≥1cavfn(p)
≤ ∑s∈S λsf(ps) ≤ cavf(p), and infncavfn(p) = cavf(p).
We have obtained that (cavfn)n≥1 pointwise converges to cavf . For each n, fn is u.s.c. so cavfn
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is continuous. f is u.s.c as an infimum of u.s.c. mappings, so cavf also is continuous. ∆(K) being a
polytope, the convergence of (cavfn)n≥1 to cavf is uniform (see e.g. Mertens et al [9, part A, p.46, ex.
15]). 2
Acknowledgments. The author thanks S. Sorin for explanations about the fact that player 2 can
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